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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Ernesto Santana has asked this Court to grant a 
certificate of appealability for his challenge to the district 
court's denial of habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2255.  As a preliminary matter, Santana's request requires us to 
determine whether the filing fee payment requirements of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 apply to in forma pauperishabeas 
corpus petitions and appeals.  We conclude that they do 
not.  Reaching the merits of the request, we find that Santana's 
petition is wholly without merit, hence the request for a 
certificate of appealability will be denied. 
                                I. 
         Santana pled guilty in 1992 to one count of conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of 
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846.  The district 
court sentenced him to prison for the statutory minimum period of 
120 months.  In the present habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, Santana claims that his counsel rendered 
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to 
an alleged miscalculation of a Sentencing Guideline range and by 
failing to correct the district court's alleged misconception of 
its ability to reduce his Guideline level.  Santana asserts that 
but for counsel's errors his minimum sentence could have been as 
low as 87 months.   
    By Order entered April 12, 1996, the district court 
denied the request for a writ of habeas corpus.  The district 
court concluded that, because the statutory minimum sentence 
associated with Santana's offense exceeded the Sentencing 
Guideline range asserted by Santana, the request for habeas 
relief lacked merit.  Santana filed a timely notice of appeal, 
which, in light of the recent amendments to habeas corpus law, 
was construed as a request for a certificate of appealability.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(1)(B).  
                        II. 
                                A. 
    Before examining the merits of Santana's request, we 
consider whether, in light of the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
("PLRA"), Santana must pay the appellate docketing and filing 
fees of $105.00.  On April 26, 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA as 
Title VII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 
(1996).  Section 804 of the PLRA, which amends 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 
redefines the rights and obligations of litigants who are granted 
in forma pauperis status.  Prior to the passage of the PLRA, 
imprisoned litigants who were granted leave to proceed in formapauperis 
could seek and easily obtain waivers of filing fees.  
The PLRA, however, requires prisoners proceeding in formapauperis who 
bring "civil actions" or appeals of "civil actions" 
to pay all filing fees.  The PLRA also establishes an elaborate 
deferred payment schedule by which litigants may fulfill their 
filing fee obligations.  If an imprisoned litigant's funds are 
insufficient to pay the full filing fee, the prisoner must pay an 
initial partial filing fee.  Thereafter, the prisoner must make 
monthly payments to the court until the filing fee is paid in 
full.   
         In the present case, the district court granted 
Santana's motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.  Thus, 
if the PLRA is applicable to a habeas corpus action such as 
Santana's, then he must somehow pay filing and docketing fees of 
$105 in order to obtain judicial review of his petition for 
relief.   
                                B. 
         The PLRA applies to prisoners who bring a "civil 
action" or who appeal a judgment in a "civil action or 
proceeding."  28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), (b).  But the PLRA neither 
defines "civil action" for purposes of in forma pauperislitigants nor 
expressly excludes habeas corpus proceedings from 
its scope.    
         At first blush, the plain meaning of the PLRA appears 
to require petitioners for habeas relief to fulfill its filing 
fee obligations.  Habeas corpus proceedings are technically civil 
actions.  Ex Parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883).  Not only 
do habeas petitions fit within the literal scope of the PLRA, but 
§ 802(a) of the PLRA, which applies to "civil action[s] with 
respect to prison conditions,"  explicitly excludes habeas corpus 
proceedings from its scope.  18 U.S.C. § 3626.  As a result, one 
could argue that, because Congress excluded habeas corpus 
petitions in one provision, it would have done so in the filing 
fee provision if it had intended.  See, e.g., Van Doren v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 1996 WL 506627*1 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that the PLRA 
applies to habeas corpus proceedings); see also Green v. 
Nottingham, 90 F3d 415, 418 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
"petitions for a writ of mandamus are included within the meaning 
of the term 'civil action'" for purposes of the PLRA).  
         We do not believe, however, that the meaning of the 
phrase "civil action" as used in the PLRA is plain.  First, 
habeas corpus cases are, in effect, hybrid actions whose nature 
is not adequately captured by the phrase "civil action"; they are 
independent civil dispositions of completed criminal proceedings.  
James S. Liebman, 1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
2.1, at 3 (1988). The "civil" label is attached to habeas 
proceedings in order to distinguish them from "criminal" 
proceedings, which are intended to punish and require various 
constitutional guarantees.  Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, 1112 
(2d Cir. 1984); see also Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. at 559 
(Habeas corpus review is a civil proceeding because 
"[p]roceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings and 
proceedings for the punishment of crimes are criminal 
proceedings.").  In light of their hybrid nature, habeas 
proceedings are often determined to be outside the reach of the 
phrase "civil action."  See, e.g., Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 
487, 490 n.4 (1971) (nationwide service of process under 28 
U.S.C. § 1391(e) applicable in civil proceedings against United 
States employees and officers is not available in habeas corpus 
proceedings); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) (civil 
discovery rules do not automatically apply to habeas 
proceedings); Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987) (a 
habeas corpus suit is not a "civil action" for purposes of an 
award of attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)); Boudin, 732 F.2d 1107 (similar); Dillard 
v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[H]abeas cases are 
not automatically subject to the rules governing civil 
actions."); see also Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 of the 
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
apply to habeas corpus proceedings only to the extent they are 
not inconsistent with the habeas rules). 
         Furthermore, the express exclusion of habeas 
proceedings found in § 802(a) of the PLRA does not require us to 
hold that habeas proceedings are "civil actions" for purposes of 
the PLRA.  Section 802, which amends 18 U.S.C. § 3626, limits the 
power of the federal courts to issue orders of relief from prison 
conditions by requiring that a "prison release order" be issued 
by a panel of three judges.  A "prison release order," defined as 
an order "that directs the release from or non admission of 
prisoners to a prison," § 3626(g)(4), contemplates relief akin to 
that provided by a writ of habeas corpus.  Thus, whereas the 
phrase "civil action" used in the PLRA's provision regarding 
filing fees does not clearly encompass habeas proceedings, the 
text of § 802 does.  As a result, in order to distinguish between 
prison release orders and habeas proceedings, Congress felt 
compelled to exclude expressly such proceedings from the scope of 
§ 802. 
         Finally, the plain meaning interpretation of the PLRA 
is undermined by Congress's passage of the antiterrorism law 
proximate to its enactment of the PLRA.  On April 24, 1996, two 
days before it passed the PLRA, Congress passed the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").  Aimed at curbing 
groundless litigation, the AEDPA imposes significant restrictions 
on the filing of second or successive petitions for habeas corpus 
relief.  If Congress had wanted to reform the in forma pauperisstatus of 
habeas petitioners, it might have done so in the AEDPA; 
yet nothing in the AEDPA changes the filing fees attached to 
habeas petitions or a prisoner's obligation to pay those filing 
fees.    
         Because of the foregoing reasons, we believe that the 
phrase "civil action" as used in § 1915(b) lacks a plain meaning.  
We must therefore consider whether the phrase includes habeas 
corpus proceedings in this context.  The two courts that have 
previously considered this issue agree that Congress did not 
intend to include habeas proceedings in the category of "civil 
action" for the purposes of § 1915(b).  See Martin v. United 
States, 1996 WL 528816 (7th Cir.); Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676 
(2d Cir. 1996).  We concur with those Courts.  In determining 
whether a statute governing "civil actions" applies to habeas 
corpus proceedings, we must examine its context.  See In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1995 (Simels), 775 
F.2d 499, 503 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The application of each statute or 
rule using the words `civil action' must be decided on the basis 
of its language, its history and its purpose.").  In Reyes, 90 
F.3d at 678, Judge Newman noted that nothing in the text or 
legislative history of the PLRA "indicate[s] that Congress has 
endeavored to make the filing fee payment requirements to apply 
to habeas corpus petitions [or appeals]."  Rather, Congress 
enacted the PLRA primarily to curtail claims brought by prisoners 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Torts Claims Act, most of 
which concern prison conditions and many of which are routinely 
dismissed as legally frivolous.  See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-378, 
104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (The PLRA "limit[s] the remedies for 
prison condition lawsuits."); 141 CONG. REC. S14418  (daily ed. 
Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (The PLRA will limit 
frivolous "prison condition lawsuits," such as a prisoner who 
"sued demanding that he be issued Reebok ... instead of Converse" 
brand shoes.").   
         The text of the PLRA itself reflects this focus.  
Section 802 of the PLRA limits remedies in prison conditions 
cases.  Section 803 restricts § 1983 actions by requiring 
prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to 
filing such claims.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).  Section 806 
narrows the availability of relief under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act by prohibiting prisoners from bringing actions against the 
government for mental or emotional injury absent a showing of 
physical harm.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).  Relying upon the PLRA's 
purpose, the Second Circuit has noted that the PLRA applies to 
special proceedings like habeas corpus "if the ... claim is 
analogous to the typical suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
complaining about prison conditions."  Reyes, 90 F.3d at 679 
(quoting In re Paul Nagy, 89 F.3d 115, 117 (2nd Cir. 1993)).  
Although we do not suggest that the only civil actions to which 
the PLRA applies are prisoners' suits seeking relief from prison 
conditions, we agree with the Second Circuit that, where a claim 
is not analogous to such a suit, the PLRA should be applied with 
caution.  See Reyes, 90 F.3d at 679 n.1.   
         Furthermore, when the PLRA is read as a whole, it is 
apparent that Congress did not intend for the statute to apply to 
habeas proceedings.  The PLRA establishes an elaborate 
installment payment plan by which litigants may fulfill their 
filing fee obligations, yet does not increase the $5 filing fee 
for a habeas corpus petition.  In comparison, the filing fee for 
a civil complaint is $120.00.  28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).  Congress 
surely did not intend for the installment plan of the PLRA to 
apply to habeas corpus actions merely to assure deferred monthly 
payments of a $5.00 fee. See Reyes, 90 F.3d at 67. Furthermore, § 
1915(g) limits a prisoner to three frivolous suits or appeals in 
a lifetime.  To hold that the PLRA was applicable to habeas 
corpus actions would prohibit a prisoner who had filed three 
groundless civil suits from seeking habeas relief from unlawful 
imprisonment.  As Judge Posner observes in Martin, 1996 WL 528816 
*2, "[t]his result would be contrary to a long tradition of ready 
access of prisoners to federal habeas corpus."  This is a result 
that we cannot countenance.        
         For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the filing 
fee payment requirements of the PLRA set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(b) do not apply to habeas corpus petitions or to appeals 
from the denial of such petitions.  Henceforth, the Clerk of this 
Court and the clerks of all of the district courts in this 
Circuit shall not impose the financial requirements of the PLRA 
in forma pauperis habeas corpus cases or appeals brought under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255.   
 
                               III. 
    Turning to the substance of the request for a 
certificate of appealability, we find no basis for granting it.  
In his plea for habeas relief, Santana reproaches his counsel for 
failure to object to a miscalculation of his sentence, asserting 
that the Sentencing Guideline range for his offense requires a 
minimum sentence of only 87 months.  The crime to which Santana 
pled guilty, however, carries a mandatory statutory minimum 
sentence of 120 months.  21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841 (b)(1)(A).  In a 
case such as this, where the statutory minimum sentence exceeds 
the defendant's guideline range, the court is required to impose 
the statutory minimum sentence.  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(c)(2); see alsoUnited 
States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 135 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) 
("Where a statutory minimum is above the Guideline range, it 
becomes the guideline sentence.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2057 (1996).   
    We recognize that a statutory minimum sentence is not 
an absolute barrier to a lesser sentence:  
    Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the 
    authority to impose a sentence below a level 
    established by statute as minimum sentence so as to 
    reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the 
    investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
    committed an offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  In Santana's case, however, the barrier 
remains inviolable.  A court is powerless to impose a sentence 
below a statutory minimum without a motion of the government; in 
this case, the prosecution made no such motion.  See Melendez, 55 
F.3d at 134 ("Congress has authorized sentences below a statutory 
minimum only upon the prosecution's motion.").  Moreover, by his 
own admission, the only assistance that Santana provided the 
government related to his own involvement in the conspiracy, 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition at 6-7, not that of 
"another person who has committed an offense."   28 U.S.C. § 
3553(e).  Thus, Santana cannot fault his counsel for failure to 
press the government to make such a motion.   
    Because the court was powerless to impose a sentence 
below the statutory minimum, Santana cannot show that his 
attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable as required 
by a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).   
                               IV. 
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the filing fee 
payment requirements of the PLRA set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) 
do not apply to habeas corpus petitions or to appeals from the 
denial of such petitions.  Because we also find that Santana's 
claim of ineffective counsel is without merit, his request for a 
certificate of appealability will be denied.  
                                              
 
